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ANCILLARY RIGHTS OF THE INSURED AGAINST HIS
LIABILITY INSURER
ROBERT E. KEETON*

The primary right of the insured against his liability insurer is the
right to reimbursement of loss falling within the coverage defined
in the policy. The scope of that right is ordinarily determined by
construction of the clauses defining the Bodily Injury Liability and
Property Damage Liability Coverages.' The present article is concerned with ancillary rights, arising in part from these and other
policy provisions and in part from the relationship created by liability
insurance. These rights of the insured are, from the opposite point of
view, duties of the insurer-duties concerned principally with settlement of the tort claim or defense against it. This article is also concerned with preservation of the insured's rights in the face of a
defense of non-co-operation and with preservation of the insurer's
defenses in the face of conflicts of interest affecting the conduct of its
representatives, including the attorney appointed to defend in the
name of the insured. The company's duties regarding settlement are
considered first, since the legal doctrines in this area are rather fully
developed and will serve by analogy to support suggestions concerning
unsettled problems in other areas.
I. THE INsURE'S DUTY REGARDING SETTLEMENT
A. The StandardPolicy Provisionand the Conflict of Interest
The current standard provision of the automobile policy concerning
defense and settlement declares that the company shall defend but
"may make such investigation, negotiation and settlement of any
claim or suit as it deems expedient."2 Though as an original question
* Professor of Law, Harvard University; editor, Basic Insurance Law
(1960).
This article is adapted from a lecture prepared for the Institute on Automobile Liability Insurance at the Law School, Vanderbilt University, on
October 16, 1959. The writer gratefully acknowledges the valuable research
assistance of Stanley Belkin, LL.B. Harvard Law School, 1960, and Norton
Hall, Class of 1962, Harvard Law School.
1. See Appleman, Overlapping Coverages in Liability Contracts, 13 VAM.
L. Rnv. 897 (1960); Plummer, Automobile Policy Exclusions, Id. at 945.
2. Standard Provisions for Automobile Combination Policies, Basic Auto-
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such a clause might have been construed as giving the company a
privilege but not a duty concerning settlement of the tort claim
against the insured, it is now clear that under this and similar
clauses the company has a duty to the insured regarding settlement.
The supporting rationale most commonly urged is that this duty
arises out of the relationship created by the liability insurance contract, rather than being derived from any particular contractual
provision. The most significant aspect of this relationship is the company's power of control over settlements that affect not only its own
interests but also the interests of the insured. If, for example, the
policy limit per person is $10,000, and the claimant, having sued for
$50,000, offers to settle for $10,000, the insured's interests are best
served by settlement except in unusual situations in which a settlement might adversely affect other interests of the insured. On the
other hand, were there no potential liability for noncompliance with
a legal duty to settle, usually the company's interests would be best
served by refusal to settle since, in the gamble of litigation, it might
win a verdict and in any event could lose nothing more than the proposed settlement figure and the cost of unsuccessful defense.
B. Tort or Contract?
The company's duty to settle is usually referred to as a duty
sounding in tort rather than contract, 3 though the distinction is
rarely essential to a decision. There are a few situations in which the
classification is critical, however. For example, the characterization
of the cause of action as one sounding in contract may result in the
application of a longer period of limitation. A recent California
case, taking the position that the cause of action sounds in both contract and tort, allows the plaintiff to elect the contract theory to
4
take advantage of the longer limitation period.
mobile Liability and Physical Damage Form, Insuring Agreements, para.
II (2d rev. 1955). A similar clause appears in other standard policy forms;
e.g., Standard Provisions for Automobile Combination Policies, Family Auto-

mobile Form, Part I-Liability (lst rev. 1958). The standard provisions for
automobile policies are prepared by collaboration among voluntary associations of insurers-the National Bureau of Casualty Underwriters, the Mutual

Insurance Rating Bureau, and the National Automobile Underwriters Associa-

tion. See Faude, The 1955 Revision of the Standard Automobile Policy Coverage: Insuring Agreements and Exclusions, in 1955 ABA SECTION OF INSURANCE
LAw PROCEEDINGS 48, reprinted 1955 INS. L.J. 647. Even insurance companies
that are not members of one of these associations use most of the standard
provisions in their policy forms.
3. See, e.g., Tennessee Farmers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hammond, 200 Tenn. 106,

290 S.W.2d 860 (1956); Southern Fire & Cas. Co. v. Norris, 35 Tenn. App. 657,
250 S.W.2d 785 (E.S. 1952).

4. Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal.2d 654, 328 P.2d 198 (1958).
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C. The Standardof Conduct
The standard used in judging whether the company has complied
with its duty regarding settlement involves two major issues. First,
is the basis of liability bad faith or is it negligence? A number of
cases have held that only good faith toward the insured is required,5
and at the opposite extreme a few have held that both good faith and
ordinary care are required. 6 In the middle ground fall the more
numerous cases recognizing at least a duty of good faith and either
expressly or silently leaving unresolved the question whether there
is also a requirement of ordinary care with respect to settlement.
Though efforts have been made to sustain the proposition that one
or the other of these two rules is the majority rule, the jurisdictions
falling in the middle group where no decisive choice has been made
are so numerous that it is somewhat misleading to speak of a
majority rule on the point.
In most of the Tennessee cases, the insured's attorney asserting
liability on the theory that the company failed to exercise good faith
has not asserted a duty of ordinary care even as a supplemental ground
of claim. Tactical considerations often support this course of action.
Usually the same evidence would be relied upon to support the
inference of bad faith and the inference of negligence. If the jury
were given the three-fold choice of finding (1) no fault, or (2)
negligence only, or (3) bad faith, the hopes for obtaining a finding of
bad faith would be somewhat reduced because of the tendency of
juries toward compromise-a tendency that would favor the intermediate finding of the lesser degree of fault, negligence. It is usually
a reasonable tactical decision to take the risk that a jury that might
have found negligence if given a threefold choice will not find bad
faith when given a twofold choice, in preference to the risk that a
jury that might have found bad faith if given a twofold choice will
find only negligence when given a threefold choice and that the
supreme court will then decline to impose liability for negligence.
But the argument that negligence without bad faith will support
liability in excess of policy limits for failure to settle is not foreclosed
by the Tennessee cases.
In Aycock Hosiery Mills v. Maryland Casualty Co.,7 an employer
5. E.g., Georgia Cas. Co. v. Mann, 242 Ky. 447, 46 S.W.2d 777 (1932); City

of Wakefield v. Globe Indem. Co., 246 Mich. 645, 225 N.W. 643 (1929); Radio
Taxi Serv., Inc. v. Lincoln Mut. Ins. Co., 31 N.J. 229, 157 A.2d 319 (1960) (4-2
decision); Best Bldg. Co. v. Employers' Liab. Assur. Corp., 247 N.Y. 451, 160
N.E. 911 (1928); Berk v. Milwaukee Auto. Ins. Co., 245 Wis. 597, 15 N.W.2d

834 (1944).

6. E.g., Douglas v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 81 N.H. 371, 127 Atl. 708
(1924); Dumas v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 94 N.H. 484, 56 A.2d 57 (1947);
G. A. Stowers Furniture Co. v. American Indem. Co., 15 S.W.2d 544 (Tex.
Comm'n App. 1929).

7. 157 Tenn. 559, 11 S.W.2d 889 (1928).
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claimed that his workmen's compensation insurer mishandled the
defense and wrongfully refused to settle, with the result that a
judgment of damages at common law was rendered against the
employer on the theory of responsibility for injuries sustained by a
minor employed illegally without a certificate. In sustaining liability
of the insurance company, the court remarked that "the contract of
insurance created a relation out of which grew the duty of the
8
casualty company to exercise, not only good faith, but ordinary care."
It is not clear, however, whether the court intended the negligence
theory to apply to the refusal to settle as well as the manner of defense. Moreover, even if so construed, this passage was arguably
dictum, and if not dictum was at best only one of several grounds of
decision, since the court found bad faith and negligence with respect
to the defense.
In Southern Fire & Casualty Co. v. Norris,9 a judgment of liability
of the company upon a jury finding of bad faith was affirmed, and
in the appellate opinion the following passage appeared: "In view
of the charge requiring a showing of bad faith in failing to settle
within the policy limit there is no occasion to consider whether the
1
negligence rule should have been applied to that aspect of the case."'
More recently the Supreme Court of Tennessee has said, "We think
our cases, and the authorities generally, support the complainant's
[insurer's] contention that there is no liability upon an insurer for
11
judgments in excess of the policy limits except in case of bad faith."
The holding of the supreme court, however, was an affirmance of the
lower court's dismissal of declaratory proceedings filed by the insurer, on the ground that the insurer should not be permitted to
force the defendant insured into a forum of its choosing and compel
him to litigate his tort claim, involving a fact issue of good faith, in
the chancery court. Since this reasoning is equally applicable to a
claim based on negligence, the passage quoted above appears to be
dictum.
Thus, in Tennessee, as in many other states, the question whether
negligence can be a ground of liability in excess of policy limits has
not been squarely decided, but in this state a decision against liability
for negligence seems likely. This point is significant since circumstances may arise in which it will appear unlikely that a jury will
make the nominally harsh finding of bad faith, yet likely that they
will find negligence. For example, if the conduct on which the case
against the company must be made is exclusively the conduct of
8. Id. at 568, 11 S.W.2d at 892.

9. 35 Tenn. App. 657, 250 S.W.2d 785 (E.S. 1952).

10. Id. at 675, 250 S.W.2d at 793.
11. Tennessee Farmers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hammond, 200 Tenn. 106, 112, 290

S.W.2d 860, 862 (1956).
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a lawyer who is known and respected in the community, clearly a
jury will be more hesitant to find bad faith than to find negligence.
The second major issue involved in the standard by which the
company's conduct regarding settlement is tested concerns the relative degree of consideration the company must give to the insured's
interests in comparison with its own, where they come into conflict.
Where this issue has been squarely faced and carefully considered,
almost uniformly it has been resolved in a rule that the company
must give the insured's interests equal weight to its own, or as it is
often expressed, it must give his interests "at least equal weight".
This formulation is somewhat confusing, since at the point of decision
whether to settle or decline settlement it may seem that one interest
or the other is being sacrificed. The rule is more readily understood,
especially as part of a jury charge, if expressed in another form.
The combination of the requirements of good faith and 'equal consideration may be expressed in the following simple proposition,
which could appropriately be used as an instruction to the jury:
With respect to the decision whether to settle or try the case, the
insurance company must in good faith view the situation as it would if
there were no policy limit applicable to the claim. 2
Though this formulation has not been specifically approved in appellate opinions, it seems well supported in principle by opinions
stating the duty as one of good faith and "equal consideration" to the
interests of the insured. The concept of equality referred to is like
the concept of equality of men before the courts. It refers to impartiality-in this instance, impartiality in the weighing of the two
competing interests. The easiest way to conceive of the exercise of
such impartiality is to conceive of the two competing interests as
being held by a single person, who thus would have no inducement to
sacrifice one over the other except on the basis of their relative merit.
The special meaning ascribed to "bad faith" in this context, however, sharply limits the practical significance of the facts (1) that
it may be permissible for the company to give its own interests equal
weight in reaching a decision concerning a settlement proposal and
(2) that juries are less likely to reach severe judgments against respected local attorneys than against less well-known adjusters. The
bad faith referred to is not synonymous with dishonesty. This point
is illustrated in the recent case of Tennessee Farmers Mutual Ins. Co.
v. Hammond.13 The trial judge, in passing on the motion for a new
12. For a more detailed statement of the arguments supporting this formulation, see Keeton, Liability Insurance and Responsibility for Settlement, 67
HARV. L. REV. 1136, 1142-48 (1954). Also see Annot., 40 A.L.R.2d 168, 181-83,
186-90 (1955).
13. 306 S.W.2d 13 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1957). Another phase of this litigation
is referred to in note 11 supra.
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trial, remarked that it was clear that the attorney employed by the
company to represent the insured in the tort claim had not been
guilty of dishonesty. 14 The appellate court nevertheless affirmed a
judgment for the insured on the theory that the conduct of the
company's representatives, including the attorney, amounted to "bad
faith" such as to support liability in excess of policy limits. In short,
in many jurisdictions at least, bad faith can be established by proof
that the defendant engaged in a course of conduct involving a deliberate preference of the company's interests over the insured's
irrespective of whether the company's representatives honestly believed that such a course of conduct was within their legal rights.
D. Settlement Demands
Some aspects of the duty to settle, though not fully developed in
case law, appear to be readily determinable in principle. One of these
concerns a settlement demand that exceeds the policy limit. The
duty to settle can nevertheless be invoked if the insured is willing to
contribute the difference between the policy limit and the total settlement demand. 15 It should be noted that the company would be asking
for trouble, however, if it suggested such a contribution without
making it clear that the company stood ready to contribute its entire
policy limit. Such a proposal would clearly support the inference
that the company was preferring its own interests over those of the
insured by declining to offer its policy limit though the settlement
proposal in excess of the policy limit was a reasonable one.
It is also clear that a demand by the insured that the company
settle is not a prerequisite of liability in excess of policy limits; nor
is the making of an offer by the claimant a prerequisite. 16 But without the claimant's offer and the insured's demand, the insured might
sometimes find himself unable to prove an opportunity to settle and
bad faith or negligent refusal to make it; in any case, the insured's
problems of proof are greatly reduced if the claimant has made an
14. Id. at 17.
15. See, e.g., Boling v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 173 Okla. 160, 46 P.2d 916
(1935). Cf. Peerless Ins. Co. v. Inland Mut. Ins. Co., 251 F.2d 696 (4th Cir.
1958).
16. For its bearing on both points, see Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Robb, 267
F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1959). The jury found for the insurer in relation to a
theory that it acted unreasonably in declining claimant's settlement offer
before trial, but against the insurer on a second theory that it acted unreasonably, after the tort case had developed unfavorably at trial, in failing to
accept the original offer if it remained open or to initiate new discussions
and bring about settlement if it did not remain open. Though reversing because of error in the charge, the appellate court were "of the view that the
district judge did not err in instructing the jury that they could consider
whether the insurer was negligent either or both in rejecting the firm offer
and in not thereafter undertaking to make a settlement. . . ." Id. at 476.
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offer of settlement and the insured has advised the insurer of his
contention that the offer should be acepted.
E. Multiple Insurers and Claimants
Another proposition that seems clear in principle is that the duty of
settlement remains in effect, though its application becomes considerably more complex, in situations involving several insurance
companies (because of reinsurance or other insurance) or several
claimants. Whether "other" insurance is proratable or instead is
excess coverage, it would seem that each insurer has a duty to the
insured. As a matter of factual proof, it might be somewhat more
difficult than in single-insurer cases for the insured to fix responsibility, but this potential difficulty is reduced by the fact that threeparty law suits have a way of resolving themselves into fights over
whether only one of the defendants should be required to pay, and
if so which one, rather than whether plaintiff should win or lose.
It would seem also that each insurer has a duty to the other insurer
in the case of proratable coverage, and that in the case of excess
coverage the primary insurer is responsible to the excess insurer for
improper failure to settle, the position of the latter being analogous
to that of the insured where only one insurer is involved.17
With respect to the duty of each company to the insured, reinsurance might be distinguished from "other" insurance. In "other"
insurance situations each insurer plainly has a direct relation with the
insured, and therefore a duty to him. In reinsurance situations, however, where the primary carrier has made an independent contract
with the reinsurer, the latter bears no direct relation to the primary
carrier's insured, and probably would not be liable to him. The
primary carrier would not escape responsibility to its insured by
yielding to the judgment of the reinsurer concerning settlement,
however, and where the primary carrier incurred liability in excess
of policy limits by failing to settle, the reinsurer might be liable for
reimbursement of the primary carrier, depending on the provisions of
the reinsurance contract. 18
The analogy to the case of the single insurer and single claimant
holds also for cases involving multiple claimants as well as multiple
insurers. Suppose that one policy provides $10,000 of primary cover17. On the last point, see Hawkeye-Security Ins. Co. v. Indemnity Ins. Co.,
260 F.2d 361 (10th Cir. 1958). The right of the excess carrier might be supported either on the theory that it is subrogated to the right of the insured
against the primary carrier or on the theory that the relationship between
primary and excess carriers gives rise to an independent duty of the former
to the latter.
18. See Peerless Ins. Co. v. Inland Mut. Ins. Co., 251 F.2d 696 (4th Cir.
1958).
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age, -a second provides $10,000 of excess coverage, and the total claims
of three claimants could be settled without exceeding the combined
policy limits, either for any single claim or for the total for all these
claims. These added factual complexities do not affect the basic
principle, though they increase the difficulties of proof that misconduct of one or both insurers blocked a potential settlement within
policy limits.
Situations involving multiple claimants and limited coverage present problems of preferential settlement also. For example, if the
coverage limit per accident is $10,000 and there are half a dozen
claimants whose total claims far exceed $10,000, what happens to the
insurance proceeds? From the point of view of the insurance company, there is danger of paying the full $10,000 and then being confronted with a claim that part of the payment was misapplied. From
the point of view of the claimant, there is danger the $10,000 will be
paid out to other claimants and he will get nothing. This problem
has been considered in detail elsewhere, 19 and is discussed in summary fashion here, primarily to urge that the problem deserves the
creative attention of courts and counsel. As the cases have developed,
the insurance companies have been successful in avoiding liability
beyond the policy limit in the absence of bad faith or negligence
toward the insured,rather than the claimant-bad faith, for example,
in failing to settle when there was a total settlement offer within the
policy limit. One of the several techniques of company protection
that has produced desirable collateral effects is interpleader. There
have been technical difficulties with interpleader, but the trend has
been toward freely allowing this procedure as a reasonable means of
judicial allocation of the policy proceeds, in preference to leaving the
allocation to out-of-court methods. On the other hand, to date no
claimant in any reported case has ever succeeded in requiring that an
allocation be made when the company was not willing for it to be
made. In some cases wherein a claimant sought allocation, the company, not yet having paid out the policy proceeds, responded with
interpleader. In others the claimant's attempt occurred after the
company had settled several of the claims and had exhausted the
policy limit in settling. In such situations, the company has not been
held liable beyond the policy limit.
Claimants should have protection against preferential settlements.
If no kind of remedy is provided in the courts, fair allocation of
limited policy proceeds is left to chance or worse. One possible result is the disposition of policy proceeds on a first come, first served
basis-the one who can rush through and get his tort judgment first,
19. Keeton, Preferential Settlement of Liability-Insurance Claims, 70 HAav.

L. REv. 27 (1956).
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and file his garnishment proceeding, gets as much as is needed (up to
the policy limit per person) to satisfy his judgment, and other claimants are left to fight over the remains. Another possibility is that the
insurance company will be able to say to each claimant, "Cooperate
with us, and get your settlement demand down, or else we will settle
with others and you will get nothing." This bargaining weapon should
not be placed in the hands of the insurance company. A solution to
this problem lies within the inherent power of those courts exercising
equitable jurisdiction. It ought to be possible for a claimant (or for
that matter, an insurer or an insured) to get judicial protection against
preferential settlement upon showing that there are several claims,
that the potential claims are far in excess of the policy limit, that the
insured himself is not financially responsible, at least to the extent
of these claims, and that there is a limited fund of insurance available
for the satisfaction of all these claims. The fair method of disposition
is an allocation of the policy limits among claimants-a proration
according to the value of their claims. This should not be done in a
way that prevents settlement; full litigation of all such claims would
be disadvantageous to the parties and unduly burdensome upon
courts. But a court could enter an order allocating the policy coverage
tentatively to the several claims. That is, if there were six claims,
the judge would make not a dollar valuation but a relative valuation
of the six claims in this equitable hearing and would allocate the
policy limit of $10,000 among those six claims, then leaving it to the
parties to negotiate on each claim separately and to settle if possible
within the policy limit allocated to it. Of course this proposal is
debatable, but it is surely within the power of the courts of equity,
without departing from precedent, to grant such relief in this new
kind of case that has only arisen with the development of liability
insurance. It may be hoped that some attorney will seek such relief
at an early stage in his case, since it is more likely that a court would
then find it equitable to grant it. If relief is not sought until after
one or more settlements have already been made by the company and
the proceeds have been paid out, the chances of establishing this
principle are minimal, because it then involves imposing liability on
the company in excess of the policy limit.
F. Has the Insured a Duty of Mitigation?
There have been suggestions from time to time that the defendant
company, in a suit for excess liability, might urge in defense that the
insured has violated a duty to mitigate damages, that is, a duty to
settle at a reasonable figure rather than allowing the case to go to a
judgment in excess of policy limits. One of the clearest judicial inti-
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mations that such a defense would be sustained appears in Southern
Fire & Cas. Co. v. Norris.20 A grave doctrinal difficulty with this notion is that it implies a transfer of control over the settlement decision from the company to the insured. It is inconceivable that courts
would subject the insured to a duty to mitigate damages by settling
unless they would also hold the company bound by a reasonable
settlement made by the insured after the company's wrongful refusal
to settle; that is, the insured would be able to recover from the company the amount he paid in settlement. It seems most improbable
that the mitigation theory suggested in the Norris case will be accepted
upon mature consideration. The issue was not squarely presented in
that case because it was not proved that the insured's financial condition was adequate for him to effect the settlement; obviously, even if
a duty of mitigation were recognized, no breach would be demonstrated in the absence of proof that the insured was financially able to
make the settlement which it is claimed he should have made. Not
only would a decision finding a duty to mitigate seem unwise, however; it would also seem unwise from the long-range point of view
for insurance companies to urge such a duty. For the benefit of potential victory in a few cases, they would be sacrificing to a considerable
degree the measure of control they now have over settlement negotiations and decisions. In the long run, the detriment to the companies
from that loss of control would outweigh the benefit of an occasional
victory on the theory that the insured failed to act in mitigation.

IL THE INSURED's DuTy OF

COOPERATION

A. The Source of the Duty

Standard automobile policies contain, among the "conditions," this
provision:
The insured shall co-operate with the company and, upon the company's request, shall attend hearings and trials and shall assist in effecting settlements, securing and giving evidence,
obtaining the attendance
2
of witnesses and in the conduct of suits. 1

The list, in the latter part of this clause, of things that the insured
shall do upon the company's request is not all-inclusive; that is, the
more general phrase stating that the insured shall co-operate with
20. 35 Tenn. App. 657, 250 S.W.2d 785 (E.S. 1952).
21. The "assistance and co-operation" clause, of which the first sentence is
quoted above, concludes with a second sentence as follows: "The insured
shall not, except at his own cost, voluntarily make any payment, assume any
obligation or incur any expense other than for such immediate medical and
surgical relief to others as shall be imperative at the time of accident."
Standard Provisions for Automobile Combination Policies, Basic Automobile
Liability and Physical Damage Form, Conditions, para. 18 (2d rev. 1955).
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the company is not limited by the succeeding list of specific items.
Canons of construction concerning the resolution of ambiguities
against the company and the limitation of the general by the particular are not likely to be applied to this duty of co-operation, since it is
a duty that would surely be inferred by the courts from the relationship between the company and the insured even if the insurance contract were silent on the matter. In this respect it is analogous to the
insurer's duty of good faith in relation to settlement, as to which, it is
generally argued, the insurance contract is silent.
B. Attendance at Trial
American Fire & Casualty Co. v. Vliet 22 involved a dispute over the
meaning of the provision in the assistance and co-operation clause stating that the insured shall, upon the company's request, attend hearings and trials. After Vliet had recovered a judgment against the
Battles, who were the insureds under the policy in question, he proceeded in garnishment against the company. The company defended
on the ground that the Battles had failed to attend the garnishment
trial and to give the garnishee other assistance contemplated by the
insurance contract. At the time of the garnishment trial in Miami, the
Battles were living 750 miles away. Mr. Battle had become insane.
Mrs. Battle rendered "every assistance possible" up to the time she
left Miami, and offered to return for the trial, but only if the garnishee would pay her expenses. In allowing a verdict and judgment
for Vliet against the company, the Florida court stated that while
courts have uniformly construed the assistance and co-operation
clause to mean that the assured must attend trial without pay for loss
of time, he is not required to attend at his own expense.23 On the
proposition that the insured need not incur out-of-pocket expenses,
there is not likely to be any dissent. A "supplementary payments"
clause in standard policy forms states that the company shall "reimburse the insured for all reasonable expenses, other than loss of
earnings, incurred at the company's request." 24 Even the supposition
in Vliet that the insured can be required to attend trial without compensation for his lost wages may be challenged, at least in extreme
cases of severe impact upon the insured's income or job status. The
duty to attend trial upon request probably applies only if the request
is reasonable, and the statement in the supplementary payments
clause that the company shall reimburse expenses other than loss of
22. 148 Fla. 568, 4 So.2d 862 (1941).
23. Id. at 571, 4 So.2d at 863. Cf. Beam v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
269 F.2d 151 (6th Cir. 1959).
24. Standard Provisions for Automobile Combination Policies, Basic Automobile Liability and Physical Damage Form, Insuring Agreements, para. II
(b) (4) (2d rev. 1955).
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earnings surely would not be construed as an agreement by the insured to bear the loss of wages incident to attendance at trial under
circumstances such that it was not reasonable for the company to
request it of him.25 An obligation to incur such a loss seems inconsistent with the concept of insurance as a protection to the insured from
financial risks, rather than a source of additional financial burdens. It
is not to be expected that such an obligation will be imposed when
not expressed.
C. Must the Insurer Prove Prejudice?
Another ground of decision by the Florida court in the Vliet case
was that the company must show substantial prejudice in the particular case from the failure to co-operate, in order for such failure to
constitute a defense.26 On this point, there has been much disagreement. A point of view contrary to that of the Florida court is represented by Judge Cardozo's opinion in Coleman v. New Amsterdam
Casualty Co.27 In that case, a customer sued an insured corporation,
which operated a drugstore, for damages resulting from error in the
filling of a prescription for a mixture of belladonna and nitro-glycerin.
The insurance company's attorney, preparing to defend, sent for one
Weiss, who had compounded the prescription and was also secretary
of the insured corporation. Weiss stated that there had been a mistake, but refused to say more unless the insurance company would
undertake to pay any judgment recovered against him personally as
well as any judgment recovered against the insured. The insurance
company disclaimed liability, and judgment for damages followed by
default. After the insured was adjudged bankrupt and execution was
returned unsatisfied, the claimant then brought action against the
company, and the company defended on the ground of breach of the
assistance and co-operation clause. Plaintiff claimed that the default
was immaterial, since there was no evidence that co-operation would
have defeated the claim for damages or diminished its extent. Judge
Cardozo responded: "Co-operation with the insurer is one of the
conditions of the policy. When the condition was broken, the policy
was at an end, if the insurer so elected." 28
25. In some current policies there is a provision for compensation of the
insured's loss of wages, not to exceed $25 per day, incurred at the company's
request. Though this provision would serve as a maximum limit on the
amount of the insurer's liability for lost time, as well as clarifying the fact
of such liability, still in some cases the argument might prevail that it
would be unreasonable to demand that the insured attend trial without reimbursement of his loss of income if the loss would be much greater than $25
per day.
26. 148 Fla. at 571, 4 So.2d at 863.
27. 247 N.Y. 271, 160 N.E. 367 (1928).
28. Id. at 277, 160 N.E. at 369.
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A recent Illinois decision appears to adopt an intermediate position
between the Cardozo view and the requirement of proof of prejudice. 29 The alleged breach was the insured's false statement to the
company that he rather than another occupant of the car was driving
at the time of the accident. The statement was corrected about nine
months later. The court stated in dicta that "timely revelation of the
truth might render an incipient breach immaterial . . ." but that an
actual showing of prejudice is not required. 30 Concluding that the
revelation in this case was not timely, the court found a breach of the
co-operation clause. This breach, however, was held to have been
waived by the company, since it failed to attempt a reservation of its
rights for a period of almost a year and a half, during which interval
its attorney took the insured's deposition in contemplation of the filing
of a declaratory judgment action concerning the breach, but without
notifying the insured of such purpose.
It could be argued that this Illinois decision, rather than occupying
an intermediate position as suggested above, is consistent with the
Cardozo view that co-operation is a condition of the policy and that
the company's obligation is at an end if it is broken; the reconciliation
would be on the ground that once breach is established, prejudice
need not be shown, but that trivial irregularities do not amount to
breach of the duty to co-operate. But the tone of the opinion seems
inconsistent with this explanation of the result.
The Cardozo opinion in Coleman was cited with approval by the
31
Supreme Court of Tennessee in Pennsylvania Ins. Co. v. Homer.
That case, however, involved a statement by the insured admitting
fault and accepting responsibility for damages to the other vehicle,
signed apparently because the insured was worried about hit-and-run
charges. It might be argued that this conduct was such clear proof of
prejudice that the opinion does not have weight as a considered choice
among the competing views on the necessity for proof of prejudice.
D. The FactIssue ConcerningBreach
Aside from a few specific rules such as that under which the insured
29. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Keller, 17 Ill. App. 2d 44, 149 N.E.2d 482 (1958).
30. Id. at 50, 149 N.E.2d at 485.
31. 198 Tenn. 445, 281 S.W.2d 44 (1955). But cf. Central Nat'l Ins. Co. v.
Horne, 326 S.W.2d 141 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1959), dismissing an insurer's suit
against its insured for recovery of the amount paid under collision coverage.
The insurer's theory was that the insured had committed an actionable breach
of policy obligations by failing to co-operate in the prosecution of a subrogation claim against a third party. The cburt held the Assistance and Cooperation Clause inapplicable, and as an alternate reason for dismissal stated
that even if the clause applied to the subrogation suit, the insurer could not
recover without proof that it was damaged by the insured's conduct. Of
course Home is easily reconciled with Coleman and Homer on the facts,
though the Home opinion arguably points toward a requirement of proof of
prejudice.
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need not pay the costs of transportation to attend trial, the question
whether particular conduct on the part of the insured amounts to
non-co-operation is a fact question. Directly relevant to litigation
over the assistance and co-operation clause is the general trend of
increasing reluctance of courts to rule that reasonable jurors could
not differ concerning a particular fact issue on the evidence before
them.
The point is illustrated in Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co. v.
Chapman,32 a recent case before the Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit. The act of non-co-operation charged by the company was
collusion between the insured, Foster, and the claimant, who was his
sister-in-law. On the evening before the trial, Foster, at the request
of the claimant's attorney extended through the claimant, went to the
office of the claimant's attorney, for an interview. The attorney stated
that his purpose was to get information to prepare his case properly,
and he assured Foster that in the event of a verdict beyond the coverage the claimant would release Foster of any responsibility for
the excess. The company's attorney did not know of this meeting.
Previous to such meeting, the settlement figure demanded by the
claimant was $15,000; at the start of trial, the claimant's attorney
raised his settlement demand to $20,000 and gave notice to the company that he would also look to the company for any amount of the
verdict beyond $20,000. The claimant's attorney called Foster as a
witness during the presentation of claimant's case. In answering a
question, Foster expressed the opinion that he was legally responsible
for the accident. In his opening statement the claimant's attorney had
described the occurrence just as Foster outlined it in his testimony,
and the claimant's account closely paralleled Foster's. Trial resulted
in a verdict for $7,500, which was within policy limits, and thereafter
the claimant commenced this action against the company. The court
of appeals sustained a jury verdict for the claimant on this evidence.
The court noted that the conduct of the claimant's counsel in arranging an interview with the insured after he was represented by counsel
appointed by the company was a violation of the canons of ethics, but
observed that the misconduct of the claimant's attorney was not
chargeable to the insured. The court considered that ordinary candor
demanded of the insured that he inform the company of the conference, but that this breach of obligation by the insured was not so
substantial as to require a conclusion that the company was relieved
of liability. Perhaps even today other courts would have found the
defense of non-co-operation established as a matter of law in these
circumstances. Certainly a different result would have been probable
32. 269 F.2d 478 (4th Cir. 1959).
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twenty years ago, and this case is an illustration of the trend toward
the unwillingness of courts to withdraw a fact issue from a jury today
-a trend that probably is going too far to serve the best interests of
the community in sound procedures of adjudication. This change has
a very significant impact upon the practical meaning of the duty of
co-operation. Though some claimant's attorneys have been inclined
toward willingness to submit an issue of breach of co-operation to
nonjury trial, it would appear that generally a claimant's attorney
better serves his client's interests by insisting on jury trial. Neither
judges nor jurors can be depended upon to resolve such fact issues
in favor of claimants in all situations, however, and conduct such as
that of the claimant's attorney in the Chapman case is not only improper under the canons of ethics but also unwise as unduly risking
the effectiveness of the insurance coverage.
III. THE

INSURER's DUTY OF DEFENSE

A. The Source of the Duty
The standard policy clause, within the scope of its applicability,
requires the company to "defend any suit against the insured alleging
such injury . . . even if such suit is groundless, false or fraudulent .... -"33 From this clause is derived the proposition, quite generally recognized, that the insurer's duty to defend is determined by
the allegations of the complaint against the insured rather than by
the true circumstances of the incident on which suit is based.M
B. The Standardof Conduct-Negligenceor Bad Faith?
In most of the cases concerning liability of the company for the
manner in which it has conducted the defense, it has been assumed
35
or stated that the insurer must exercise ordinary care. Though occasionally good faith rather than ordinary care has been stated as the
standard of performance required of the insurer, usually such statements have occurred in cases involving an alleged breach of the duty
to settle, in association with an alleged breach of the duty to defend.
Nevertheless, the acts or omissions involved in most of the cases holding or assuming that ordinary care is required could be distinguished
from the act of deciding not to settle. That is, these cases of negligence in defense have concerned inadvertence or thoughtless omis33. Standard Provisions for Automobile Combination Policies, Basic Automobile Liability and Physical Damage Form, Insuring Agreements, para. II
(a) (2d rev. 1955).
34. Annot., 50 A.L.R.2d 458 (1956).
35. See, e.g., Anderson v. Southern Sur. Co., 107 Kan. 375, 191 Pac. 583,
(1920); Abrams v. Factory Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 298 Mass. 141, 10 N.E.2d 82
(1937).
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sions, e.g., failure to discover important evidence, failure to advert to
and develop a particular ground of defense that apparently was sound,
failure to answer, or failure to perfect appeal in due time. In contrast,
the conduct involved in the cases concerning liability for failure to
settle is usually a considered exercise of judgment. If this distinction
between inadvertence and mistake of judgment is given effect, marginal cases will arise in which it will be difficult to determine factually whether an omission (e.g., failure to urge a particular ground of
defense) was due to inadvertence or instead to an error of tactical
judgment. Often the issue in marginal cases will be one of fact. But
these difficulties of administration are not alone enough to condemn
the distinction.
If inadvertence and mistake of judgment are distinguished, a considered decision not to appeal an adverse judgment in excess of policy
limits is more nearly analogous to the decision not to settle than to
failure to discover a witness or inadvertence to a deadline for answer
or appeal. This suggestion has support in the recent case of HawkeyeSecurity Ins. Co. v. Indemnity Ins. Co. 36 In a tort action against Northern Utilities Co., a claimant recovered a judgment of more than
$22,000. The attorney for the liability insurer, Hawkeye, recommended an appeal on the ground that no specific acts of negligence
were proved and that the trial court erred in applying the doctrine of
res ipsa Zoquitur to the case. Hawkeye declined to appeal except on
condition that the costs of appeal would be prorated between Hawkeye and the insured (or Indemnity Insurance Co., which occupied the
position of the insured in these negotiations since Indemnity carried
coverage for the insured's liability in excess of the $10,000 primary
coverage provided by the Hawkeye policy). Indemnity Insurance Co.
arranged for the appeal to be prosecuted in the name of the insured,
and after the appeal proved unsuccessful, brought suit, as subrogee of
the insured, Northern, to recover the cost of appeal. Recovery was
denied on the theory that mere proof that Hawkeye declined to follow
the advice of its counsel failed to establish the bad faith necessary to
liability for failure to appeal. Though it might also have been considered that such proof was insufficient to establish negligence in
failing to appeal, the opinion plainly indicated that the court regarded
the standard of liability as one of bad faith rather than negligence.
An analogy that might be urged in support of the suggested distinction between inadvertence and mistake of judgment is the dual standard adopted by some courts, in relation to the failure to settle, requiring only good faith as to the decision regarding settlement but
36. 260 F.2d 361 (10th Cir. 1958).
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ordinary care as well in the investigation leading to such decision.3 7
Another instructive analogy, however, is the troublesome distinction
between discretionary and ministerial acts, in relation to governmental immunity from liability for negligence. The modern trend of reducing the scope of the immunity from liability for a negligent
discretionary decision suggests that it would be better not to import the
distinction into the area of law concerned with the insurer's duty of
defense. Moreover, the public policy justifications for the immunity of
public officials are inapplicable here. A consistent requirement of
ordinary care in all matters pertaining to defense seems preferable.
C. Effect of the Insurer's Tender of Policy Limits
One of the sharply disputed problems concerning the duty of defense is the question whether the insurer may discharge its entire
duty by paying out the policy limit in settlement, or else tendering
the policy limit for applicaiton to settlements at the discretion of the
policyholder. The few decisions in point are not in harmony.
American Casualty Co. v. Howard38 is one of the decisions favoring
the insured. It was held that the company's duty of defense was not
discharged by payment of the policy limit on a judgment obtained
against the insured, under the South Carolina Death Act, and that
the insurer was obligated to defend a second suit, the latter under the
Survival Act, for conscious pain and suffering of the same decedent.
Denham v. LaSalle-MadisonHotel Co.39 is one of the decisions favoring the company. In that case the insured contended that regardless
of whether the company was liable for payment of claims in excess
of $10,000 which it had tendered, the company had severable obliga37. E.g., Ballard v. Citizens Cas. Co., 196 F.2d 96 (7th Cir. 1952); Olympia
Fields Country Club v. Bankers Indem. Ins. Co., 325 Ill. App. 649, 60 N.E.2d

896 (1945); Southern Fire & Cas. Co. v. Norris, 35 Tenn. App. 657, 250 S.W.2d
785 (E.S. 1952). See Radio Taxi Serv., Inc. v. Lincoln Mut. Ins. Co., 31 N.J.

299, 157 A.2d 319 (1960). In Hilker v. Western Auto. Ins. Co., 204 Wis. 1,

231 N.W. 257 (1930), affirmance upheld on rehearing,204 Wis. 12, 235 N.W.
413 (1931), the duty of care was extended also to negotiation, though only
good faith was required with respect to the insurer's decision to settle or not.
38. 187 F.2d 322 (4th Cir. 1951). See also American Employers Ins. Co. v.
Gobel Aircraft Specialties, Inc., 205 Misc. 1066, 131 N.Y.S.2d 393 (Sup. Ct.
1954).
39. 168 F.2d 576 (7th Cir. 1948). See also Travelers Indem. Co. v. New
England Box Co., 157 A.2d 765 (N.H. 1960); Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co. v.
McCarthy, 90 N.H. 320, 8 A.2d 750 (1939). But a dictum in the McCarthy
case, supra at 323, 8 A.2d at 752, indicates that the duty is not discharged
by merely paying the limit to the insured and casting on him the burden of
investigation, settlement, or defense. Faude reports that the position taken
by most insurance companies in 1955 was consistent with this dictum. Faude,
supra note 2, at 53-54. See also DesChamps, The Obligationof the Insurer To
Defend Under Casualty Insurance Policy Contracts, 26 INS. COUNSEL J. 580

(1959); Kemper, Avoiding the Hazard of Excess Liability and the Expense of

Defense by Settlements for Policy Limits, 17 INs. COUNSEL J. 145 (1950);
Annot., 126 A.L.R. 898 (1940).
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tions to defend the insured against liability with respect to each of
about 250 claims for damage to or loss of property of guests of the
insured's hotel incident to a fire that compelled all guests to leave
in haste. The court held that the company was obligated only "as
respects insurance afforded by this policy, '40 and was not required to
defend after tendering the policy limit. "[The insured's theory]
would produce the incongruous situation that plaintiff would have a
continuing obligation to defend, notwithstanding its obligation to
'41
pay has been exhausted."
It might be argued that placing the company in control of the litigation after it no longer has a stake is inconsistent with prohibitions
against corporate practice of law.42 But the point is debatable. Cer-

tainly an agreement of a company to reimburse the insured for whatever costs of defense are incurred, including fees to an attorney selected by himself, would not be violative of prohibitions against corporate practice of law. If it be considered that the company's right of
control over the litigation under the defense clause of the policy is
inconsistent with prohibitions against corporate practice of law, would
not this conclusion be applicable irrespective of payment or nonpayment of the policy limit in damages? The only difference is that the
company has a direct interest in the result of the litigation in one
instance and not in the other. But surely prohibitions against corporate practice of law, if applicable at all to this problem, should not
be subject to evasion by the corporation's contracting for an interest
in the very litigation the handling of which is urged to amount to
corporate practice of law. That would be exactly the effect of liability
insurance. It seems preferable to acknowledge that recoguition of
the validity of the defense clause of liability insurance policies is
inherently a determination that the kind of control of litigation that
a liability insurance company exercises in selecting and instructing an
attorney who appears as counsel for the insured is not corporate practice of law within the meaning of prohibitions against such practice,
and that the potential evils and countervailing benefits are not so
different in the case of defense after the company's payment of the
policy limit in damages as to warrant a conclusion that an insurance
contract expressly providing such a benefit to the insured would be
against public policy. It follows that the issue whether such benefit
is provided by current policies should be determined on the basis
of a fair and reasonable construction of the policy clause.
Some of the policy forms in use many years ago clearly gave the
40. 168 F.2d at 584.
41. Ibid.

42. See Appleman, Conflicts in Injury Defenses, 1957 INs. L.J. 545, 560;
Faude, supra note 2, at 53; DesChamps, supra note 39, at 586.
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company a three-way option of defending, settling, or paying to the
insured the face amount (thus leaving the insured to defend at his
own expense, or settle.) 43 Under those circumstances, the insurer
could avoid any liability for defense by tendering the face amount
of the policy. But forms currently in use provide as follows:
With respect to such insurance as is afforded by this policy for bodily
injury liability and for property damage liability, the company shall:
(a) defend any suit against the insured alleging such injury, sickness,
disease or destruction and seeking damages on account thereof, even
if such suit is groundless, false or fraudulent.

. .. 44

This is only a slight modification of the form commonly used just
prior to the 1955 revision. The language then used was as follows:
As respects the insurance afforded by the other terms of this policy
under coverages A [Bodily Injury Liability] and B [Property Damage
Liability], the company shall [defend, etc.] . . . .45
It has been stated that the editorial amendments of the 1955
revision,
while seemingly minor in nature, are designed to make the defense
provision more clearly subordinate to the main introductory paragraph of the policy, which [after the 1955 revision as well as before]
states the company's entire contractual undertaking as "subject to
the limits of liability, exclusions, conditions and other terms of this
policy." 46
Apparently this statement refers to the change from the expression
"the insurance afforded by the other terms of this policy under coverages A and B" to the expression "such insurance as is afforded by
this policy for bodily injury liability and for property damage liability." Perhaps the idea is that the former expression may have
been construable as referring only to the other terms stated under
the sections of the policy designated coverages A and B, and not also
to the "main introductory paragraph of the policy" that included the
phrase, "subject to the limits of liability," etc. But even if this main
introductory phrase is accepted as a qualification of the duty to
defend, it is far from clear that it means that such duty is exhausted
43. See, e.g., Brassil v. Maryland Cas. Co., 210 N.Y. 235, 104 N.E. 622 (1914).
44. Standard Provisions for Automobile Combination Policies, Basic Automobile and Physical Damage Form, Insuring Agreements, para. II (2d rev.
1955).
45. This phrasing appears in a specimen stock-company form supplied in
the early 1950's by the Association of Casualty and Surety Companies for
use in college insurance courses. The same phrasing appears in the specimen
mutual-company policy, printed in PATTERSON, CASES ON INSURANCE LAW 79293 (3d ed. 1955). See also DesChamps, supra note 39, at 582.
46. Faude, supra note 2, at 54 (Emphasis is Faude's.). Cf. DesChamps,
supra note 39, at 582-84, 586-87.
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by payment of the policy limits. If that was the intention of the
drafters of the amended form, it was not clearly expressed, and the
vagueness is the more significant in view of the former use of a
clause clearly specifying a three-way option. Probably courts should,
and most will, hold that the company's duty to defend continues even
after payment of the policy limits in damages, and a fortiori after a
mere tender of the policy limit to the insured. But the question
remains one of considerable doubt. It was reported immediately after
the 1955 amendment that the associations were considering a further
clarifying amendment on this subject,47 but the more recently revised
Family Automobile Form does not contain any such clarification,
though there have been editorial changes incident to incorporation
of the defense clause into the coverage clauses.48
D. The Duty to Share Control of the Defense
In those cases that are concerned with only the tort claim against
the insured, but in which he has an uninsured interest since the
policy limit is insufficient to cover the entire risk, the defense clause
of the policy appears to grant exclusive control of the defense to the
company, though of course the companies concede that the insured
may have independent counsel observing and participating in an
advisory capacity. But the defense clause of the policy does not
provide for cases of joint interest arising from other claims directly
involved in or collaterally affected by the suit. One such situation
is that arising where the insured has a reciprocal claim. 49 Another
such situation was presented in Krutsinger v. Illinois Casualty Co. 50
It was there held that if a suit in tort against the insured involves
some claims as to which the company has no responsibility, either
47. Faude, supranote 2, at 54.
48. StandardProvisions for Automobile Combination Policies, Family Automobile Form, (1st rev. 1958), includes the following clause within Part ILiability:
Coverage A-Bodily Injury Liability:
Coverage B-Property Damage Liability
To pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the insured shall
become legally obligated to pay as damages because of:
A. bodily injury, sickness or disease, including death resulting
therefrom, hereinafter called "bodily injury," sustained by any
person;
B. injury to or destruction of property, including loss of use thereof,
hereinafter called "property damage";
arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of the owned
automobile or any non-owned automobile and the company shall
defend any suit alleging such bodily injury or property damage
and seeking damages which are payable under the terms of this
policy, even if any of the allegations of the suit are groundless,
false or fraudulent; but the company may make such investigation
and settlement of any claim or suit as it deems expedient.
49. See text accompanying notes 53, 54 infra.
50. 10 Ill. 2d 518, 141 N.E.2d 16 (1957).
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as to defense or payment of damages, and other claims as to which
it affords at least some coverage, it is the duty of the company to
share the defense with the insured. It was not necessary to the decision in that case to elaborate the nature of this duty, since there was
a breach by refusal of the company to participate in the defense in
any way. On principle, it would seem that a breach might also be
committed by a company's insistence upon full control over the
defense in the face of the insured's insistence upon a right to share
in the conduct of the defense insofar as it might affect the non-covered
claims within the suit.51
Sharing control of the defense is impractical, however, where full
protection of the separate interests of the company and the insured
requires inconsistent contentions that cannot be presented in a
common defense. Other procedures according full protection to the
conflicting interests of both the company and the insured should be
52
recognized.
IV. CONFLICTS OF INTEREST AFFECTING
DuTIES OF CO-OPERATION AND DEFENSE
Normally both the company and the insured desire that the tort
claim of a third person be resisted effectively. Thus the insured is
motivated by self interest as well as duty to co-operate with the
company, and the company is similarly motivated to defend effectively. Only in abnormal cases, therefore, are the courts confronted
with disputes over these duties of co-operation and defense. Such
cases arise because of the conflict between the mutual interest of the
company and the insured in effective resistence to the tort claim and
their diverse interests of other types.
A. Illustrations
One common situation in which there may be a conflict of interest
between the insured and the insurer with respect to defense arises
from the existence of a reciprocal claim. That is, C, the claimant, is
asserting a claim against D and D's liability insurer, and D is also
asserting a claim against C and C's liability insurer. The conflict
may arise with respect to the conduct of litigation in which both
claims are at issue, or litigation placing at issue one of these claims
and collaterally affecting the other. Both D and D's liability insurer
are interested in proving that C was negligent and that D was not.
But their interests do not always coincide; for example, trial tactics
51. This proposition is supported by Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Stewart Dry
Goods Co., 208 Ky. 429, 271 S.W. 444, (1925).
52. See § IV (B), infra, at 860.
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will be affected by the fact that in some cases the insurer will be as
well satisfied with findings of negligence against both parties as with
a finding of no negligence against D, whereas D is insistent on aiming
at the latter result.53 Another potential conflict of interest is that
concerning the advisability of an appeal which would possibly result
4
in a new trial as to both the claim against D and D's claim against C.5
The resolution of these conflicts has not been the subject of enough
appellate decisions to support any clear conclusions as to the probable
course of legal development. On principle, however, it would seem
that the company and the insured should be held to mutual obligations to give to the interest of the other such weight, relative to that
given its own conflicting interest, as would be given by an individual
holding both interests. There have been indications of a contrary
view, which would permit the company to protect its own interest
even at the expense of the interest of the insured.5 5 But the suggestion of mutual obligations of the type stated above is strongly
supported by the analogy to the company's obligation with respect
to liability in excess of policy limits for failure to settle.56
Another type of conflict arises from the policy limit per person.
This is well illustrated in the Pennsylvania case of Perkoski v.
Wilson. 57 In the tort suit, a judgment was entered in favor of the
wife-plaintiff for $10,000 and in favor of the husband-plaintiff for
$3940, after verdicts of $10,000 and $6,000 respectively and the filing
of a remittitur to avoid new trial. The jury were permitted by the
instructions to award to the husband damages for loss of consortium
and loss of the wife's services. The company refused to pay more
than the $10,000 on the wife's claim and $769.13 of the award to the
husband, asserting that the remainder of the award to the husband
was damages consequential to the wife's injury and therefore in
excess of the $10,000 limit per person. The court declined to allow
the company's contention, one ground of decision being that the
lower court, though requiring a remittitur, had left it to the plaintiffs
to determine which of the verdicts should suffer the reduction, and
counsel for the company, still representing the insured, stood by and
permitted the husband-plaintiff to accept the reduction without disclosing to him that the company would then invoke a policy-limit
53. This idea has been developed in more detail in Keeton, Liability Insurance and Reciprocal Claims from a Single Accident, 10 Sw. L.J. 1, 16-19
(1956), reprinted 1957 INs. L. J. 29, 37-38.
54. Ibid.
55. E.g., Abrams v. Factory Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 298 Mass. 141, 10 N.E.2d 82
(1937); Davison v. Maryland Cas. Co., 197 Mass. 167, 83 N.E. 407 (1908) (stating that the company had the privilege of appealing to protect its own
interest, even though the insured's interest might be prejudiced by the
additional legal proceedings).
56. See § I of this article, supra.
57. 371 Pa. 553, 92 A.2d 189 (1952).
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argument that would not have been available if the remittitur had
been applied to the verdict for the wife-plaintiff.
Still another situation of conflict is that arising from collision between two automobiles insured in the same company. The leading
case on the subject is O'Morrow v. Borad.5 8 After Borad sued O'Morrow, O'Morrow obtained counsel and through such counsel filed a
cross-complaint, notifying the insuring group (affiliated companies)
that his counsel would also present his defense to Borad's cause of
action. O'Morrow then brought the suit in question for declaratory
relief against Borad and the insuring group. The latter asserted that
O'Morrow had violated the duty of co-operation, but the appellate
court approved O'Morrow's conduct, noting that it would be contrary
to public policy to allow a person to control both sides of litigation.
The court concluded that compliance with the co-operation clause
was excused and that the insuring group was liable for any judgment, costs, and reasonable attorney's fees incurred by O'Morrow
in defending himself against the claims of Borad, such fees being
recoverable in lieu of the defense required by the insurance contract.
Some companies have attempted to meet this problem by assigning
different claims personnel and different attorneys to the two sides of
the controversy, but obviously such an arrangement is less desirable
from the insured's point of view than that developed in the O'Morrow
case, and it is doubtlessly the right of the insured to insist upon the
O'Morrow arrangement. Another difficulty encountered if the company attempts to remain in control of the defense when it has coverage on both sides of the case concerns settlement. In one case, a
company's refusal to discuss settlement with attorneys for either
claimant, on the asserted theory that it could not place itself "in the
position of showing partiality to one assured" over another, subjected
the company to liability in excess of policy limits for failure to settle
within policy limits. 59
An additional type of competing interest is that incident to a close
personal relationship between the insured and the claimant. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co. v. Chapman, discussed above,6 0 is an
example. This problem of potential collusion has led to the enactment
in New York of a statute, as follows:
No policy or contract shall be deemed to insure against any liability of
an insured because of death of or injury to his or her spouse or because
of injury to, or destruction of property of his or her spouse unless express
provision relating specifically thereto is included in the policy.61
58. 27 Cal. 2d 794, 167 P.2d 483 (1946); noted 59 HARV. L. REV. 1316, 45
MicH. L. REv. 515, 31 MxNx. L. REV. 380, 14 U. Cmr. L. REv. 102.
59. Tully v. Travelers Ins. Co., 118 F. Supp. 568 (N.D. Fla. 1954).
60. See note 32 supra and accompanying text.
61. N.Y. INs. LAW § 167 (3) (Supp. 1958).
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This statute affects only a part of the field of relationships potentially
giving rise to collusion. Moreover, it is an unusual statutory provision. Thus, numerous claims are being presented in circumstances
such that the company suspects collusion between the claimant and
the insured, and a small residue of that body of cases reaches the
appellate courts.
B. Courses of Action in Cases of Conflicting Interests
When the company suspects collusion, what courses of action are
available to it? One company, through its attorney, attempted to meet
the problem by attacking, in the trial of the tort claim, the character
and motives of both the claimant and the insured, urging that they
were in collusion to present a false claim. The attack was effective
before the jury, a verdict being returned for the defendant. The
plaintiff appealed, asserting that the attorney was guilty of prejudicial misconduct. An intermediate appellate court in California, presented with this appeal in Pennix v. Winton, reversed for new trial.62
To the argument that at most there was a breach of duty toward
defendant and not plaintiff, and that defendant was not harmed
since a verdict in his favor was obtained, the court responded that
the defendant had other interests as well as those in defeating liability-among them, interests concerned with his integrity and standing in the community-that those interests might outweigh his
interest in getting a favorable verdict, and that the plaintiff had a
right to raise the issue of such breach of duty of the company toward
the insured since the conduct amounting to such breach would tend
to becloud the issues and confuse the jury.63 It is a strange spectacle,
no doubt, to observe a lawyer arguing that his client is a liar and a
cheat. In the phrases of the court, "counsel cannot serve two masters
and he can only properly represent the defendant so long as his
duties as counsel for defendant do not conflict with his duties as
counsel for the insurance carrier." 64
If the company, through its attorney, does not argue collusion
though it has evidence supporting such an argument, will its continuation in the defense of the case waive the breach of the duty of
co-operation? In this situation, a reservation of rights, or even a
non-waiver agreement to which the insured has consented, is not
certain to preserve the company's defense, since in addition to the
hurdle of waiver there is the hurdle of res judicata or estoppel by
62. 61 Cal. App.2d 761, 143 P.2d 940 (Dist. Ct. App. 1943), hearing denied,
145 P.2d 561 (1943).
63. Id. at 775, 143 P.2d at 947.
64. Id. at 774, 143 P.2d at 947. Cf. Spadaro v. Palmisano, 190 So.2d 418
(Dist. Ct. App. Fla. 1959); Annot., 48 A.L.R. 2d 1239 (1956).
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judgment. If the company continues to handle the defense of the
tort claim through its attorney, will the company be regarded as
privy to the suit so that it is estopped by the judgment from asserting
in subsequent policy litigation any fact that is contrary to those facts
necessarily determined in the prior judgment?
A problem identical in nature is presented by cases in which the
claimant sues the insured, alleging that his injuries were caused by
the insured's negligence, and the available evidence suggests that
the injuries may have been caused not by negligence but by intentional misconduct not covered by the insurance policy. Often the
claimant prefers to proceed on the theory of negligence rather than
intentional tort, because the insured is judgment proof and the
claimant's only hope for monetary recovery is to bring the case
within insurance coverage. When the insured is sued on the theory
of negligence, his interests require that the attorney representing
him contend (a) that his conduct was not even negligence and (b)
in the alternative, that it was merely negligence and not an intentional tort. The insurance company's interests would be served by
establishing contention (a), but where the evidence makes such a
finding improbable, the company's interests are best served by contending (c) that the insured committed an intentional tort, beyond
the scope of policy coverage. If the attorney employed by the company to represent the insured undertakes to make contention (c), he
is acting in violation of canons of ethics and in violation of the
sound principle recognized in Pennix v. Winton. Thus, the company's
duty to defend for the insured and the right to defend its own interests are irreconcilable. 65 It is not necessary, however, that one right
be wholly sacrificed. Two possible solutions avoiding that result
may be suggested: (1) Allow the company to refuse to defend for
the insured, and allow it to raise its policy defense, contention (c),
in the later suit on the policy, rather than holding it estopped by the
judgment in the tort suit. This result is supported by Farm Bureau
Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Hammer66 and opposed by Miller v.
65. Cf. Prashker v. United States Guar. Co., 1 N.Y.2d 584, 593, 136 N.E.2d
871, 876 (1956), observing that in a comparable situation of conflicting interest,
"the selection of the attorneys to represent the assureds should be made by
them rather than by the insurance company, which should remain liable for
the payment of the reasonable value of the services of whatever attorneys the
assureds select."
66. 177 F.2d 793 (4th Cir. 1949) (2-to-i decision), cert. denied, 339 U.S.
914 (1950). The company sought a declaratory judgment that its policy did
not cover damages awarded against its insured in five tort actions from the
defense of which the company's attorney withdrew after the insured had
been convicted of murder in the second degree for intentionally causing the
death of a passenger in another vehicle by driving his truck into it. After
the company's withdrawal, the insured made no defense, and judgments
grounded on allegations of negligence were entered against the insured.
In the declaratory proceeding, the district judge entered summary judgment
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United States Fidelity & Casualty Co. 6 7 Of course if the insured wins
the second suit, he is entitled to recover the cost of defense of the
first suit, thus having the monetary equivalent of satisfaction of the
company's obligation to defend.68 (2) Allow the company to refuse
to defend for the insured (again with the expectation of holding the
company liable for costs of defense if its policy defense finally fails),
and further allow the company to be made a party to the suit by the
claimant against the insured, by intervention at the instance of the
company, by third party proceedings at the instance of the insured,
or by joinder at the instance of the claimant. The considerations
accounting for the customary refusal of courts to allow an insurance
company to be a party to the tort suit are less forcefully applicable
here (especially if the joinder is at the instance of the company or
the insured, rather than the claimant) than to the ordinary case
involving no such conflict of interest between the company and the
insured. Probably the allowance of a three-party proceeding that
will dispose of the entire set of controversies in one trial is the ideal
solution of this problem. If this solution is denied on principle or is
foreclosed by nonsatisfaction of procedural or jurisdictional requisites,
however, it is plainly unjust to deny also the first solution suggested
above, thus holding that the company shall never have any opportunity to urge its defense. Indeed, such a denial of hearing on its
contention should be found to be offensive to principles of due
process.
This type of case, involving irreconcilable conflict between the
interests of the company and the insured concerning defense, is distinguishable from the more frequently occurring type in which the
company has a policy defense of such nature that the insured and the

against the company on the theory that it was estopped to assert that the

injuries were intentionally caused in view of the determination in the tort
judgments that they were negligently caused. The court of appeals reversed
and remanded.
67. 291 Mass. 445, 197 N.E. 75 (1935). The company contended that the insured, while driving on a highway, had an altercation with the driver of another car, sped past him and cut in sharply, causing the other driver to lose
control of his car, which then overturned. The claimant sued the insured,
alleging negligence only, and recovered a judgment, the company having
refused to defend. In the later proceeding on the policy, the court held that
the company was estopped to litigate its contention that the injury was not
caused accidentally, since theories of negligence and wilful and wanton
conduct were mutually exclusive and the company was bound by the determination in the prior suit that the insured was guilty of negligence.
Accord, Stefus v. London & Lancashire Indem. Co., 111 N.J.L. 6, 166 Atl. 339
(1933) (10-to-4 decision), cert. denied, 290 U.S. 658 (1933). Cf. B. Roth Tool
Co. v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 161 Fed. 709 (8th Cir. 1908) which held that
the insured, after suffering a judgment against itself in favor of its employee
for injuries allegedly due to the insured's negligence in allowing use of
metals of explosive nature, was estopped to claim that the injuries were not
due to explosives, when suing its insurer on an employer's liability policy
containing a warranty against use of explosives on the property.
68. See note 65 supra.
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company still have consistent interests in the defense of the tort
claim (e.g., late notice, cancellation, nonpermissive user by one other
than named insured). In those cases, the problem of estoppel by
judgment usually does not arise in any event, since the issue determinative of the dispute over coverage is not one of the issues decided
in the tort case. If the same issue does arise (as where the claimant
alleges that the insured was driving, the insured denies this, and the
policy contains an endorsement by reason of which it provides no
coverage unless the insured was driving 69) it might be argued that
estoppel by judgment should not apply.70 But the fact remains that
here the company and the insured have only consistent interests in
the manner of defense. Thus, either the company or the insured can
defend in a way that serves the interests of both, and the opportunity
for hearing on defensive contentions can be preserved without imposing on the claimant the burden of trying one issue twice in order
to recover on the liability insurance policy. In this situation, it would
seem appropriate that the company be bound by the results of the
tort trial.71
Because of the uncertainty about judicial recognition of either or
both of the two solutions suggested above, there is no clearly safe
way for the company to preserve an opportunity for hearing on its
policy defense in cases involving this type of conflict of interest between the company and the insured. In view of the indisposition of
the companies to attempt intervention in the tort suit, their more
common course of action is to deny coverage and to decline to defend
the tort case. In addition to the risk that the estoppel rule of the
69. Public Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Wheat, 100 Ga. App. 695, 112 S.E.2d 194 (1959),
holding the company estopped by the judgment in the tort suit that it refused to defend; it might have been inferred from the evidence that the
insured was honest but mistaken in his statement that he was not driving,
having been severely intoxicated at the time of the incident.
70. It might be thought that this argument is supported by State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Coughran, 303 U.S. 485 (1938). The policy provided
coverage only if the vehicle was "being operated by the Assured, his paid
driver, members of his immediate family or persons acting under the direction of the Assured" and not in violation of any law as to age or driving
license. At the tort trial, defended by the company under a nonwaiver
agreement, the claimant recovered a judgment against the assured and wife,
on the theory of negligence of the wife as operator, imputed to the husband;
the company successfully defended the later suit on the policy by showing

that an unlicensed 13-year-old girl was operating the car under the wife's
direction, in violation of law and contrary to the assured's express instructions,
the wife being at most a joint operator. The case is not good support for the
argument suggested in the text above, since the issue determinative of
policy coverage was not exactly the same as any issue decided in the tort
case. In the court's opinion it was said: "Defenses now presented by the
Insurance Company against liability under the policy were not involved.
Joint driving by Mrs. Anthony and the girl was not subject to inquiry." Id.
at 492.
71. In support of this view, see the recent case of Public Nat'l Ins. Co. v.
Wheat, supra,note 69.
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Miller case will be invoked, there are disadvantages in this course
of action. First, it is likely to increase the cost of defense since the
amount allowed to the insured's independent counsel as a reasonable
fee, in the event the dispute on the policy defense is eventually resolved against the company, will ordinarily be higher than would
have been the payment to the company's own counsel. Of as much
or more concern to the company, however, is the fear that the case
will not be as effectively and vigorously defended as if it were in the
hands of the company's counsel. Also, there is danger that the insured
will settle for an amount that the company would have considered too
high, and that the company will be bound by the settlement if it
loses the suit on the policy. The combined force of all these disadvantages leads a company to prefer remaining in control of the
defense of the tort claim, even at the expense of giving up the
potential policy defense, unless there is a very strong probability
that the policy defense will eventually be sustained in court.
Another course of action which a company might consider is a
declaratory judgment proceeding. Tennessee Farmers Mutual Ins. Co.
v. Hammond 72 was a suit in chancery by a liability insurance company for declaratory judgment to determine whether it was subject
to liability in excess of policy limits. A decree sustaining a plea in
abatement was affirmed, on the theory that the plaintiff insurance
company was anticipating a tort action against it for alleged lack of
good faith, which involved a fact issue, and that it was appropriate
for the lower court to refuse to entertain a suit where a disputed
issue of fact was determinative of the rights of the parties. The tort
action was subsequently filed in the circuit court of the same county
and was tried before a jury.
This opinion might arguably be read as precluding the use of
declaratory proceedings with respect to any claim of liability in
excess of policy limits, since an issue of bad faith (or perhaps negligence, as previously suggested) is always involved. The opinion need
not be read so broadly, however, and on principle that should not be
the rule.
Liability insurance litigation is one of the areas in which declaratory proceedings have been most frequently used. Wherever there is
an issue of coverage, it affects not only the insured but also potentially
the claimants against the insured. Occasionally an insurance company has preferred to have "two bites at the cherry" by trying to
win in the defense of the tort claim against the insured and, if unsuccessful in that attempt, then making a second try to win on the policy
defense in the garnishment proceeding or independent suit on the
72. 200 Tenn. 106, 290 S.W.2d,860 (1956).
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policy. That is a risky course, however, because of the settlement
problem. The point is illustrated by Home Indemnity Co. v. Williamson.73 In that case, the proof was that the company offered less in
settlement than would have been the case if it had not been relying
in part upon the opportunity for a second bite with respect to the
policy defense. In this situation, even a non-waiver agreement was
ineffective to protect the company since the court considered that the
company was representing conflicting interests without disclosure
of the conflict, and was thus misleading the insured as to its true
intent in the handling of the defense.
Because of this risk of liability for failure to settle and the additional factor of expense of defending the tort claim or claims, an
insurance company ordinarily would prefer to have an immediate
determination of the issue of coverage. In most courts, the insurance
company's declaratory judgment proceeding would be allowed in
this situation. But apparently the question is one that is left to the
discretion of the trial judge in Tennessee. In Southern Fire & Casualty Co. v. Cooper7 4 the insurer filed a declaratory judgment proceeding in a court of law, and the trial judge refused to make a
declaration of rights as to the duty to defend. The supreme court
held that this ruling was not an abuse of discretion since requiring
the company to defend would not deprive it of its right to contest
liability to the insured. This is hardly a realistic answer, in view of
both the cost of defense and the dilemma which arises in the event
of a settlement offer, as illustrated by the Williamson case. It is
submitted that, in the absence of special circumstances beyond those
disclosed in the report of the Cooper case, the denial of declaratory
proceedings should have been held to be an abuse of discretion. The
very purpose of declaratory proceedings is to avoid this kind of
dilemma because of uncertainty concerning legal rights. It may be
hoped that the Supreme Court of Tennessee will, in an appropriate
case, be persuaded to overrule the Cooper decision. But whether that
is done or not, that decision clearly leaves open to the trial judge
the discretion to allow declaratory proceedings, and the discretion
should be exercised in favor of such proceedings.
The Cooper case involved a policy defense of late notice. It is significant that the Supreme Court of Tennessee did not rule that the
probability that a fact issue would be involved in such a defense
would necessarily preclude the use of declaratory proceedings; rather,
the theory was, as already noted, merely that it was not an abuse
of discretion for the trial court to deny such proceedings. In another
73. 183 F.2d 572 (5th Cir. 1950).
74. 200 Tenn. 283, 292 S.W.2d 177 (1956).
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75
recent case, Pennsylvania Ins. Co. v. Horner,
declaratory judgment
was allowed by the chancellor and affirmed by the supreme court.
The insured in that case, concerned about criminal prosecution for
hit-and-run driving, had signed a statement admitting that the collision was his fault and assuming responsibility. The insurer was given
a declaratory judgment of no liability. It might be argued that there
was no fact issue involved in that declaration, on the theory that
reasonable persons could not have differed as to whether the conduct
of the insured amounted to breach of the assistance and co-operation
clause of the policy. Thus, the decision is not conclusive on the
question whether declaratory proceedings may be used even if there
is a determinative fact issue, but it seems to point in the direction of
allowing them. Neither the federal Declaratory Judgment Act nor
the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, which has been adopted in
Tennessee, contains any stated limitation on the scope of declaratory
relief to cases not involving determinative fact issues. Trial of issues
of fact by a jury is permissible in both state and federal declaratory
proceedings. 76 It is a sound proposition, however, that no declaratory
judgment act should be distorted for use as an instrument of procedural fencing-to secure delay, to affect the choice of a forum, or to
affect the question whether the issue will be tried by a jury or a
chancellor. 7 In the Hammond case, the chancellor's refusal to allow
declaratory proceedings might have been sustained on the ground that
the only apparent objective of the company in filing the proceedings,
rather than awaiting a suit by the insured, was to affect the choice
of forum and right to jury trial. Ordinarily there is little need for
declaratory proceedings as to an issue of excess liability-the issue
presented in Hammond. It would be impractical for the parties to
rely on such proceedings to get advice on whether to settle, because
of the delay while awaiting judicial decision; and it would be unwise
for the courts to enter into the business of rendering advisory opinions on the question whether a settlement should be made. When an
advisory opinion is no longer possible because the dispute has been
ripened by a judgment in excess of policy limits, litigation at the
instance of the insured will usually serve as well as declaratory proceedings at the instance of the company. But it is possible to imagine
circumstances in which this would not be so, and it seems undesirable

75. 198 Tenn. 445, 281 S.W.2d 44 (1955).
76. See TENN. CODE A.NN. § 23-1108 (1956);
MENTS

ACT §

UNIFORM DECLARATORY JUDG-

9; Declaratory Judgment Act 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02

(1959);

Annot., 142 A.L.R. 8, 58 (1943). The original federal act provided for the
submission of issues of fact to a jury on interrogatories. Declaratory Judgment Act ch. 512, 48 Stat. 955 (1934). This provision was omitted in the
revision of the code as being covered by Rule 49 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Reviser's Note to 28 U.S.C. § 2202.
77. Cf. Annot., 142 A.L.R. 8, 58 (1943).
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that declaratory relief should be arbitrarily proscribed. It may be
expected, in any event, that either by virtue of rigid rules or by
virtue of proper discretionary decisions of trial courts, excess liability claims will not often be determinable-by declaratory proceedings. As has been noted with respect to negligence claims generally78
there is not as much justification for allowing declaratory proceedings
in these cases as in disputes concerning a policy defense.
V. ATToRNEys' REsPoNsIBILITIEs IN CASES OF CONFLICTING INTEREST
Although there has been speculation concerning the potential liability of an individual attorney designated by an insurance company
to represent an insured against whom a tort claim is asserted, there
is no reported decision up to the present moment imposing such liability. On principle, however, there are strong reasons for supposing
that the attorney is subject to such potential liability both to the
insured and to the insurance company. That is not to say that an
attorney would be held responsible in each situation in which the
insured is able to recover against the company. Probably in most
instances the total conduct of the company on which liability is based
involves not only the conduct of the attorney but also that of other
representatives, including adjusters and home office claims examiners.
Also, the attorney has some practical protection in the tactical undesirability, from the insured's point of view, of having an individual
attorney as a defendant in the suit. 79 Despite the practical and
doctrinal arguments against liability of the attorney, however, the
potential exposure is enough to cause concern to any attorney, unless
he has complete confidence that the company he is representing will
not seek indemnity from him.
The attorney designated by the company to represent the insured
in defense against the tort claim is representing clients whose interests are potentially in conflict. There is no objection to such representation if both clients fully understand the situation. Thus it would
seem permissible, on principle, that an attorney represent both parties
with respect to their mutual interest in effective defense against the
tort claim, but represent neither with respect to settlement, or that
he represent only the company with respect to settlement, the insured
78. See Annot., 28 A.L.R. 2d 957 (1953),

suggesting that even though

there is nothing in the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act to exclude

declaratory proceedings involving fact issues, yet the discretion of the court
to deny declaratory relief has generally been thought to exclude such relief
in "ordinary negligence cases."
79. See Peerless Ins. Co. v. Inland Mut. Ins. Co., 251 F.2d 696, 701 (4th Cir.
1958), explaining on a comparable basis the conduct of the primary insurer
(who was seeking reimbursement from a reinsurer) in failing to assert a

potential claim against its attorney.

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 13

fully understanding the situation.8 0 Though most of the discussion
of potential liability of the attorney appointed by the company to
represent the insured has been speculative in the absence of primary
authority on the subject, there is persuasive support for liability in
opinions disapproving conduct of the attorney and penalizing the
insurer in some way because of it. An example is the Keller opinion, 81
indicating that the attorney's nondisclosure of the purpose of taking
the deposition of the insured-that is, to use it in support of a policy
defense-was improper conduct and that its occurrence precluded
the insurer's reliance upon the policy defense. If some special damage
had been suffered by the insured, not reparable by allowing him to
recover on the insurance policy, would he not have been allowed a
cause of action against the attorney? Another example is the Williamson case, 82 indicating that it was improper to withhold disclosure of
the fact that the company was relying on a two-bite plan of defense
and was therefore not considering settlement. There are three other
recent opinions of particular interest in relation to the role and
responsibility of the attorney designated by the company to represent
the insured.
In Henke v. Iowa Home Mutual Casualty Co., 83 it was held that
communications between the company and the attorney are not
privileged as against the insured. The insured can often use evidence
of such communications to great advantage in proving his claim of
negligence or bad faith of the company in relation to settlement. Such
communications might also be used effectively in a suit by the insured
against the attorney himself.
In Murach v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 84 as in Keller and
Williamson, the court was directly concerned with the obligation of
disclosure imposed on the company, but the court's opinion is relevant
also to the obligations of the attorney. Though apparently reserving the
question whether further disclosure might be required in some circumstances, the Massachusetts court found adequate, in the case at
hand, a letter calling attention to the fact that the claim was in excess
of policy limits and inviting the insureds to obtain their own counsel
to protect their interests as to the excess. The evidence indicated
that the insureds were experienced in business and legal matters and
were unconcerned with the possibility of involvement of their own
property because it appeared they had no equity of substance. Under
80. For more detailed consideration of this question, see Appleman, Conflicts in Injury Defenses, 1957 INs. L. J. 545; Keeton, Liability Insurance and
Responsibility for Settlement, 67 HARV. L. REv. 1136, 1167-73 (1954).
81. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Keller, 17 Ill. App.2d 44, 149 N.E.2d 482 (1958).
82. Home Indem. Co. v. Williamson, 200 Tenn. 106, 290 S.W.2d 860 (1956).
83. 249 Iowa 614, 87 N.W.2d 920 (1958).
84. 158 N.E.2d 338 (Mass. 1959).
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these circumstances the court held that there was no obligation even
to disclose to the insureds an offer of settlement, since it appeared
that they were not concerned with knowing about it. These were
unusual facts, of course.
A ruling of the Texas Committee on Interpretation of Canons of
Ethics is more directly in point for run-of-the-mine fact situations
involving potential liability in excess of policy limits. 85 The Committee rendered an advisory opinion in response to questions whether
the attorney designated by the company to appear on behalf of the
insured is required "to fully inform" the insured and whether, in
particular, he must inform the insured of the holding of the Stowers
case, 86 which imposed liability in excess of policy limits for negligent
failure to settle. The Committee answered both questions in the
affirmative.
If the Texas Committee opinion is sound, and it is submitted that
this is so, 87 many insurers and their attorneys are currently treading
on very dangerous ground in relying upon a letter of the type involved in the Murach case to discharge their duties of disclosure of
conflict. The lack of more explicit disclosure may not be significant
in those cases in which the insured employs independent counsel. But
if the insured is not fully aware of this conflict and does not employ
independent counsel, the failure of the attorney to make the more
explicit disclosure suggested in the Texas opinion is not only a probable violation of canons of ethics but also a potential source of
liability of the attorney and the company for loss resulting to the
insured from a tort judgment against him in excess of policy limits.
85. COMM. ON INTERPRETATION OF CANONS OF ETmIcs, STATE BAR
OPINION No. 179 (June 1958), reprinted 21 TEx. B. J. 593 (1958).

OF

TEX.,

86. G. A. Stowers Furniture Co. v. American Indem. Co., 15 S.W.2d 544

(Tex. Comm'n App. 1929).

87. But cf. Waters v. American Cas. Co., 261 Ala. 252, 73 So.2d 524, 532
(1953).

